Notion of emenation in neoplatonic philosophy

Answer: In neoplatonism the divine (necessary existence) is devoid of composition, which is ontological composition which also entails contingency in the essence of the necessary existence so that is to say, the philosphers posit that the multiplicity cannot emenate from the essence of necessary existence because otherwise it would entail plurality of beings, which is impossible since it violates the law of identity, so that whatever emanates is ontologically simplest (not in a literal meaning) as by simple or in arabic (بسيط) they mean that which has gained perfection through its ontological union with the necessary being and is only one, in essence but it is contingent since it is composite of both existence and essence, so human soul came into existence in latter realms which is not intellecting realm (عالم العقل) but it is (عالم الأرواح) imaginable realm (which is metaphysical) and it has more gradation in existence, from the sense that it has more multiplicity so the human soul (being eternal and imperfect in essence) has to gain the perfection [ontological perfection] through having an affinity with the first intellect which is deemed as (عقل الأول) which is direct emenation from the necessary being and without having a mutual affinity with the first intellect it is not possible to have affinity with the necessary being itself, the first intellect only realizes itself and the effect (in cause and effect series) which means it posseses the attribute of knowledge, so the entitle of it is identical to the first intellect.

Q: Why did God create?

Answer: Before this we would have to talk whether the attribute of God with relation to creation that he creates as in arabic (صفة الخلقية) and that creation which emenates from God or he willingly creates it, that attribute is either distinct from the essence of necessary being meaning God or it is not and to say otherwise that this attribute is other than the essence of God then that entails plurality of necessary beings which are eternal and uncaused but that is logically not possible as it violates the (law of identity) as if there are two or more necessary beings either their attributes and in concrete existence relate to one and other or not or they lack an attribute or not, if said they do lack an attribute that means that which is lacking is contingent (to be brief) and to say they are same, then it only means they are identical and there is no differentiating factor between them so they are one.

Then, when it is established that the attributes of God (as creating, knowing universals and particulars et cetra) are not other than it’s essence it is proven they are eternal when said they are eternal it means they are not within the realm of time and by time (in aristotlian logic) it is simply the measure of motion within a thing from potentiality to actuality and the transition of (p>a) potential towards actuality renders contingency which simply makes God a contingent being, it no longer remains necessary in it’s essence so creating is from the effect which is actualized itself. ‘why’ no longer remains in the question as if it were not creating it wouldn’t have actualized its own attribute (which was already actualized).

— Haider Jaffery

Q: Why God created the world to begin with?

Answer: Existence is an aspect of actuality and non-existence (potentiality) is an aspect of lackness, privation and that which has ontological lackness, albeit these two words (non-existence and potentiality) are not synonymous with each other but unless necessitated by a cause, since it is demonstrated that the necessary being is the source of all-that which exist, but existence is gradational as in arabic parlance it is (إن الوجود هُوَ متشكك) the pinnacle of that existence is necessary being (God) meanwhile the latter one being the creation that emenates from him. Necessary being (God) is not composite as composition implies dependence which is privation and possible with respect to existence. But this possibility is not sufficient for the quiddity to enter the realm of existence, because quiddity qua-itself is not merely possible in itself with respect to existence but is also possible in itself with respect to non-existence, therefore, if mere possibility were sufficient, so the quiddity would both exist and not exist simultaneously which is a contradiction not just contradiction but a conjunction of contradiction.

When it is proven that necessary being (God) is devoid of composition it necessarily follows that whatever emenates directly from necessary being (God) is also devoid of multiplicity but not at the plane of its cause, it is first intellect (which realizes itself) that has emenated from that necessary being and it is perfect, because of having mutual affinity (سنخيّة) with the necessary being and it is a known principle that when there is mutual affinity (as there is between every cause and effect) there is privation of existence, being existentially less nobler than its cause (أضعف من علته) as refered to in arabic by the philosphers, but to posit here that the more less-affinity there is, there is weakness that occurs from ontological aspect, because this casual series is infinite but not in the sense that third effect cannot be the primary cause of itself since a causal series consisting of only three parts such that the first term is the cause of the second term without itself being the effect of any cause and is therefore a pure cause and the intermediate part is the effect of the first and is also simultaneously the cause of the end term, this was an explanation with the relation to infinite regress, nonetheless to continue from where we left, that effect is less-nobler than its cause, material realm is the lowest in this hierarchical series hence being most less-affinity with necessary being (God) and being imperfect, but to mention that this is due to affinity as said above that the latter is less nobler and weaker and for God it is impossible from him to emenate plurality or multiplicity (of existents) so the intellects are intermediate cause of the material realm. Since human does not exist beyond material realm except for having a metaphysical (مجرّد) soul and it can be actualized once the affinity and connection (إتصال) increases between the soul and the necessary being.

— Haider Jaffery

Distinction between an essence and existence

When talked about existence itself it is synonymous to reality because it is neither mental nor it can be described or has any description, as sadra defines it by saying it has no genus, nonetheless in his [metaphysical penetrations] he gave several arguments on why it is synonymous with reality or is reality in itself but before we continue to explaining the notion of primacy of existence as it is held among the sadrian philosophers, the avicennian school or those who were known as illuminationists defined existence as more of a mental existence, which is inferior to essence in external reality and essence holds the primacy of it, some albeit most commentators on avicenna held this notion, but some of them differed as well. As for avicenna himself here is a qoute from his work (admonitions) where he makes distinction between the two, he says:

“Know that you understand the meaning of the triangle and doubt as to whether it is described with existence in concrete individuals (fī l-a‘yān) or not. It does not occur to you that [triangle] is in concrete individuals after it occurs to you that it consists of the line and plane figure.”

[Physics and metaphysics, Avicenna]

In arabic (since their works were originally written in it, which was dominant language at that time in these disciplines) essence or a quiddity translates to [ماهِّية] meaning “whatness” of a thing. There either “is” a thing or either “whatness” of a thing, for example if I say triangle having three-sides is the essence of a triangle there will not be an ambiguity. This notion was also held by spinoza, in his works ethics as we see he made distinction between a conditioned existence and unconditioned existence, which is same. So, then there comes a discussion with regards to ontology where avicenna categories the essence, being possible in itself meaning contingent, meaning a state where an essence is acquiescent between existence and non-existence, being impossible in itself which cannot exist in external reality and an essence for which it is necessary to exist, which is devoid of composition and whose existence is identical to it’s essence. So, to avicenna these are three categories or a state of an essence where it can exist, because there cannot be fourth, if somebody says can there be a contingent quiddity and an impossible that can exist, it would render logical contradiction (law of non-contradiction) which is known, simply it would be either contingent or non-contingent, an example of an impossible quiddity would be a squared-circle as it cannot externally exist, but an example of a contingent quiddity would be of square as it can exist externally meanwhile not entailing a logical contradiction. These would become more obvious to someone if one goes through the work of avicenna (admonitions) and the metaphysical penetrations of sadrā.

— Haider Jaffery